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EQUIVALENCE OF AUCTIONS AND POSTED PRICES*
by
Klaus Kultti
Center for Economic Research, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153,




We determine the equilibrium in two transaction mechanisms: auctions and posted prices.
Agents choose whether to participate in markets where trades are consummated by
auctions or in markets where sellers post prices. We show that the selling mechanisms are
practically equivalent. Previous studies have shown that auction markets emerge as a
unique evolutionary stable quilibrium when compared to bargaining markets. Posted
price market dominate bargaining markets similarly. Keywords: Auctions, posted prices,
random matching. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78, C73,
D44.
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1.INTRODUCTION
There are three trading mechanisms or modes of trade that are commonly encountered in
reality, namely auctions, bargaining, and posted prices. All of these have been analysed in
economic literature auctions being  perhaps the most extensively studied area. Most of
auction analysis takes place in a partial equilibrium framework while bargaining theory has
been applied to modelling the whole economy (Rubinstein and Wolinsky, 1985), too.
Posted prices are used extensively in the literature. Search models starting from Diamond
(1971) constitute a major example.
The relative performance and desirability of these selling mechanisms has been
studied from the sellers’ point of view in mechanism design literature where the purpose is
to determine the optimal selling mechanism. In this field it is usually assumed that the
seller can commit to the mechanism. Moreover the analysis is of partial equilibrium type,
and static. Recently Wang (1993, 1995) has compared auctions to posted-price selling,
and bargaining to posted-price selling in dynamic models. In his models the seller has a
choice of the selling mechanism, and the best one depends on the associated costs. The
costs are exogenous, and cannot be derived from the basics of the model. Wang also
assumes that here is only one seller who meets buyers with exogenously given
probabilities. This is not satisfactory, as one would expect the selling mechanism to affect
the buyers’ willingness to participate in the markets.
The comparison of various elling mechanisms would benefit from a dynamic
setting, where the costs, reservation values and meeting probabilities are endogenously
determined. A recent model by Lu and McAfee (1996) fulfills these requirements. They
study the relative performance of auction markets, and bargaining markets in a setting
where agents are randomly matched. Whether trades are consummated in an auction or
bargaining determines the division of the surplus which determines the desirability of the
markets for buyers and sellers. Lu and McAfee use evolutionary dynamics to determine
stable market structures or equilibria. The equilibrium market structure is not necessarily
evident since buyers tend to prefer markets where they receive a large share of th  surplus
while sellers do not find these markets attractive. However, when buyers go to their
preferred market their number increases which makes the markets more desirable to
sellers. Roughly put, Lu and McAfee find that auction markets constitute the unique stable
equilibrium. In other words, of these two trading mechanisms auctions perform better.
The purpose of this article is to study posted price markets in a similar setting as
Lu and McAfee (1996). It turns out that posted price markets are quivalent to auction
markets which is somewhat surprising since the divison of surplus seems much different.
In Lu and McAfee (1996) the seller is driven to his reservation utility if only one buyer
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appears while if many buyers appear the price is such that the buyers are driven to their
reservation utility in auction markets. In the posted price markets there is a fixed price,
and thus the sellers surplus is the same regardless of the number of buyers.
The rest of the article is organised as follows: In section 2 we present the model,
and study the auction markets and posted price markets separately. In section 3 we
determine the equilibria of the model. In section 4 we present conclusions.
2. THE MODEL
Let us consider markets with B buyers and S sellers where these numbers are large. Each
seller has a unit of indivisible good for sale, and each buyer desires exactly one unit of this
good. All sellers value the good at zero, and all buyers value the good at unity. These
valuations can be regarded as reservation values in a static one period setting. In our
dynamic setting the actual reservation values are determined endogenously.
We study two markets that may exist simultaneously. In both markets sellers are in
fixed locations, and buyers are distributed on them randomly. In one market trades are
consummated in an auction which means that before trading sellers commit to sell their
goods in an auction regardless of the number of bidders. In the other market sellers post
prices to which they commit. Both buyers and sellers can decide which markets to enter.
Agents that manage to rade exit the markets and are replaced by identical agents that on
entrance decide which markets they go to.
Time is discrete, and the agents have a common discount factor δ ∈( , )0 1 . The
events within a period proceed in a fixed sequence: New sellers and buyers enter the
markets, sellers post prices in the posted price market, buyers observe the prices, buyers
are distributed on sellers in both markets, trading takes places, and those who trade exit
the markets. Let us denote the ratio of buyers to sellers by θ = B
S
 which stays constant
over time, the proportion of buyers in the posted price markets by x, and that of sellers by
y. Then the proportion of buyers in the auction markets is 1-x, and that of sellers 1-y.
The number of buyers a seller meets is binomially distributed. Consider eg. posted
price markets. There are xB buyers and yS sellers. As the buyers are, in equilibrium,
distributed on the sellers independently with identical probabilities the probability that a
fixed seller meets any particular buyer is 1/yS.  Thus the number of buyers a seller meets is
distributed according to Bin(xB, 1/yS). Analogously the number of buyers that a seller
meets in an auction market is distributed according to Bin((1-x)B, 1/(1-y)S). We adopt the







 and β θ=
x
y
. Since binomial distributions are awkward to
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deal with we approximate them with Poisson distributions. In the auction market we use a







, and in the posted price market we use a





We study first the auction markets ince they are a bit simpler. When buyers are matched
to a seller they submit bids for the object for sale. We do not model the auction explicitly
as a game but we think that the bidders engage in a Bertrand-competition type situation
where the price is such that they are driven to their reservation utility levels. Unless there
happens to be only one bidder in which case it is the seller that receives his reservation
utility.
A seller meets no buyers with probability e−α , exactly one buyer with probability
α αe− , and two or more buyers with probability 1− −− −e eα αα . In the first two cases he
gets his reservation utility which is the same as his expected utility in the end of a period.
Let us denote this by U s
a  where, as in the sequel, the subindex refers to the type of agent
(seller or buyer), and the superindex to the type of market (auction or posted price). A
buyer always meets exactly one seller, and since there are large numbers of buyers the
probability that the buyer is the only buyer in a match is the same as the probability that no
other buyers are matched to the seller, i.e. e−α . With probability 1− −e α  there are two or
more buyers in a match. In this case the buyers receive their reservation utili y which is the
same as their expected utility in the end of a period. Let us denote this by Ub
a . The
formulae for the expected utilities of sellers and buyers are respectively
( ) ( )( )[ ]U e e U e e Usa sa ba= + + − − −− − − −δ α αα α α α1 1 (1)
( ) ( )[ ]U e U e Uba sa ba= − + −− −δ α α1 1 (2)
In (1) the LHS is the expected utility of a seller evaluated at the end of a period. The RHS
is discounted since everything happens in the next period. The first term is the utility from
meeting no buyers or one buyer in which case the seller is driven to his reservation utility.
The second term is the utility of meeting two or more buyers in which case the buyers are
driven to their reservation utility, and the seller receives the rest. The interpretation of (2)
is analogous the first term on the RHS being the utility from being the only buyer in a
match, and the second term the utility if there are more than one buyer. Notice that in this
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case it does not matter who receives the good since the price is such that all buyers receive





























2.2. Posted price markets
In these markets the sellers post prices that buyers take as given. This creates some
problems if nothing more is postulated since clearly the optimal pricing rule from the
sellers’ point of view is to post price equal to unity. Given that a fixed number of buyers
are in the markets and they are randomly distributed on the sellers it does not pay to lower
the price. This is a highly unsatisfactory way to think of posted price markets. One would
like to introduce some elements of competition by, for instance, letting the buyers choose
which sellers they go to after they have received some information about prices. This is a
bit tricky, and we discuss the details at the end of this section. For the moment let us
denote the market price by p. We focus on situations in which every seller posts the same
price.
The seller meets no buyer with probability e−β  and one or more buyers with
probability 1− −e β .  The buyer is the only buyer to meet the seller he is matched to with
probability e−β  and with probability 1− −e β  there are other buyers, too. We assume that






















... . The expected utilities of sellers and
buyers are respectively

































































Next we address the question about price determination. We try to capture the
idea that there is competition in the markets, and consequently prices affect the number of
buyers a seller meets. To this end we assume that buyers observe all prices and then decide
independently which sellers they go t . If all sellers post the same price buyers are
indifferent, and in equilibrium they choose a mixed strategy that puts equal weight to each
seller. If buyers observe non-uniform prices they choose a mixed strategy that puts
different weights to different sellers depending on the price they post. Given the
distribution of prices the buyers choose the probabilities so that they constitute a Nash-
equilibrium. We aim at determining a price p such that it constitutes a Nash-equilibrium
for sellers given buyers’ behaviour. In other words, p should be such that no seller has an
incentive to change his price if all others announce p. There may exist asymmetric
equilibria in which sellers post different prices but our focus is on symmetric equilibria. We
determine p by considering one time deviations. Notice that one time deviations are
sufficient since at he end of every period the agents leave their current partners, and by
assumption they do not recognise agents whom they have previously met.





, and that proportion z of the sellers deviate or are forced to deviate together.
That more than one seller deviates simultaneously is just a modelling trick since it makes
analysis easier, but it turns out that z can be thought to indicate the degree of competition,
too.
In equilibrium all sellers post price p. Consider proportion z of sellers who deviate
for one period and post price p’. The buyers observe the prices and choose a mixed
strategy ( , )σ σ1−  that determines whether they go to sellers with price p’ or p. The
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. In (9) the LHS is the expected utility of a buyer that
goes to a seller with price p’. If he manages to trade he gets utility 1-p’ . If not things
return to normal next period and his expected utility is given by (8). The RHS is the utility
of a buyer who goes to a seller with price p. Notice that the meeting probabilities change
as a result of the deviation. Equation (9) determines the equilibrium value of the mixed
strategy ( , )σ σ1− .
Deviators maximise ( )e U e psp− ′ − ′+ − ′β β1 . From (9) we can solve p’ as a function
of σ which yields the following objective function for the deviators
( )e U e e e U e psp bp− ′ − ′ − − ′ −+ − + ′ − ′ − +








1 1 1 1~ ~ ~ ( )
~ ~
(10)
Instead of choosing p’ we can think that deviating sellers maximise (10) by choosing σ.
The first order condition for the maximum is
( )
( )


















































































In equilibrium the deviating sellers’ maximising choice of price is p, which means that the
deviators are in exactly the same situation as the non-deviators. This means that in
equilibrium σ has to be such that ′ = =β β β
~
. Inserting this into (11) gives us the
equilibrium p as a function of z
( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )p
e e e
e e ze e
=
− − −
− − − − + −
− − −
− − − −
1 1
1 1 1 1
δ β
δβ β δ δ δ
β β β
β β β β( )
(12)
From (12) we see that p is increasing in z. We let z approach zero which means that p
attains its lowest value. This can be interpreted as a competitive environment. The sellers
have to price in such a way that not even a small number of sellers find it profitable to
deviate. Positive z would mean that deviation is possible only if many sellers do it
simultaneously. In this case a deviating seller knows that he is adversely affected since
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other sellers deviate, too, and  thus the sellers can sustain a higher equilibrium price as the
costs of deviation are partly internalised. Letting z go to zero resembles the test for Nash-
equilibrium where one deviating agent is considered. Alternatively, we could postulate that
a proportion of buyers are able to observe prices while the rest of the buyers are
distributed on the sellers randomly. This does not change the above analysis; the first order
condition (11) is the same as long as the proportion of informed buyers is strictly positive.

















Notice that when there are very few buyers (beta is close to zero) and demand is low, the
price goes towards zero, and when there are many buyers (beta grows without limit) the
price tends to unity. The price also behaves w ll in a sense that it is always between zero
and one. It is not, however, necessarily increasing in beta if the discount factor is close to
unity. This may appear somewhat odd since the message of models with perfect markets is
that price should increase with demand but the logic does not apply to imperfect markets.
In perfect markets increase in demand raises prices and makes suppliers better-off. The
posted price markets are not anomalous since increasing demand makes sellers better-off
even though because of the matching ‘technology’ this does not necessarily translate into
higher equilibrium price.
3. THE EQUILIBRIUM
As the purpose is to compare auctions and posted price markets we allow the co-existance
of both types of markets. In the beginning of a period the agents decide which markets
they go to. Sellers in the posted price markets announce prices, and buyers adopt a mixed
strategy that determines to which sellers they go. In equilibrium none of the agents should
be able to do better by changing his strategy. There are three possible equilibrium
configurations in the economy: i) Only auction markets exist, ii) only posted price markets
exist, and iii) auction markets and posted price markets co-exist. The t st for equilibrium
is of Nash-type, and we immediately see that cases i) and ii) constitute an equilibrium. If
there is only one market then any deviator goes to the other inactive market, and since he
is there alone he cannot do better than in the active market.
Both markets  exist simultaneously if buyers and sellers are indifferent between
which markets to participate in. Equating sellers’ expected utilities (3) and (7) in both
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markets produces a condition that we call fo owing Lu and McAfee (1996) sellers’



















































θ θ . From this we
see that in equilibrium the agents enter either market in equal proportions, i.e. x=y. We
state these observations as
Proposition 1. Either market by itself constitutes an equilibrium. For any θ there exist a set
of equilibria { }( , ):x y x y0 1< = <  with two active markets.
Lu and McAfee (1996) conduct similar analysis with bargaining markets and
auction markets. They also study the stability of equilibria in evolutionary dynamics. Same
kind of analysis with auctions and posted price markets is not particularly interesting since
the two modes of trade are practically equivalent. In evolutionary sense all equilibria are
unstable which is not surprising since the agents are indifferent between all equilibria with
two active markets.
The equivalence of auction and posted price markets is an interesting result but
one should remember that it is based on rather restrictive assumptions. First, we study
situations in which all the buyers are identical, and all the sellers are identical. It is not
clear that the result holds if, say, sellers’ valuations are random draws from a known
distribution like in auction theory. Secondly, while the modelling of auctions is
straightforward there may be other reasonable ways to determine the posted prices. We
deal with a simple procedure which still requires us to introduce more structure into our
framework than there is in a typical random matching model.
4. CONCLUSION
In this article we study the viability of two modes of trade; posted price markets and
auction markets. We use a tractable and well specified random matching model developed
by Lu and McAfee (1996) who study the viability of auctions and bargaining. They find
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that when agents are allowed to choose which markets to participate in auctions dominate
bargaining in a sense that in evolutionary dynamics auction markets are the only stable
equilibrium. We show that auctions and posted price markets are practically equivalent,
and it is easily seen that posted price markets dominate bargaining markets exactly the
same way as auction markets dominate bargaining markets.
To render the study of various trading institutions meaningful one must introduce
some frictions that make markets non-Walrasian or imperfect. We have used a model in
which agents are randomly matched. This allows us to determine which institutions are
likely to emerge in equilibrium. In reality one rarely sees auction markets like in this article
while posted price markets seem to exist in abundance. Markets where trades are
consummated by bargaining are often characterised by posted prices, too, a familiar
example being the market for cars. A crucial assumption in the article and related work is
that the seller is able and willing to commit to the trading mechanism. This a not an
uncontroversial assumption in markets with many buyers and sellers. In a work under
progress we assume that sellers announce a trading mechanism to which they are able to
commit if they meet exactly one buyer. If they meet more buyers there is competition
which means that the object is sold in an auction.
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